nCOV
IT STARTED IN CHINA
Probably the first record of a person having contracted COVID-19 from the novel coronavirus nCOV or SARS-CoV-2, that is now terrorising the planet, is that of a 55-year-old man from Hubei province on November 17, 2019 ( South China Post). So, that's a lot earlier than early January, which anecdotally is more generally taken as the start of the scourge; and it is not in Huwan, the capital city of the region and home of the infamous, highly unhygienic wet markets, selling fish, meat, poultry, live stock and wild animals.
It
takes a whole six weeks between this first case and a first report by China to
the WHO of 41 cases of a new contagious viral infection in the city of Huwan . There
have been other cases in between, and doctors who have flagged it could be a
new and dangerous respiratory disease (not flu) have been silenced. The 41
cases are a cluster and the patients are all customers or vendors at the wet
market. Six weeks and only 41 cases, and no further cases elsewhere in the
province; the under-reporting or -identifying has started; not only in China,
but undoubtedly everywhere, as nCOV spreads. (See Axios,
a US electronic medium, for a full timeline).
It is
a well-known fact that horseshoe
bats are corona virus carriers. Other (earlier) outbreaks of corona viral
infections in humans have all been picked up from one or other horseshoe
species; however, not directly, as in all cases, an intermediate host species has
been required. A virus has to mutate to become infectious for another host
population, and in-one-fell-swoop from bat to man is difficult. For example, SARS-CoV
(just plain old SARS to you and me) first infected the masked palm civet, which
then zoonotically transmitted the disease to us. MERS-CoV (Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome) idem ditto, via the dromedary camel.
The
accepted current thinking is that in the case of nCOV, it is the scaly
ant-eating pangolin
that is the intermediate host. Anything is possible, but in northern climes,
horseshoe bats hibernate in caves and other dark empty spaces, where pangolins
don't go.
Where
pangolins do go (or did) is the Huwan wet markets. China's very first action on
admitting that the nCOV outbreak was severe was to close these down, but
recently they have begun to re-open again, admittedly with a national ban on
the sale and slaughtering of pangolins (and palm civits and other wild
delicacies) in place since February 24.
However,
pangolin meat retails at €500 a kilo (New
York Times), and their scales, that have purported medicinal qualities, are
also in demand, so, even the Chinese must realise that once a mass facility for
this profitable trade can be availed of again, it will, ban or no ban. So,
either they are not so worried about the pangolin as the carrier after all, or
they have a vaccine ready or near-ready.
What
the Chinese also did, of course, was to gradually shut Wuhan down (and three
neighbouring cities). By January 23 this is complete. All flights in and out,
and all public transport are cancelled, but not before 5 million people leave.
Everybody is ordered to stay at home. A week later, all 16 cities in Hubei
province have been 'closed', affecting c 57 million people, but another
fortnight passes before other provinces and the rest of Hubei are 'closed',
affecting c 230 million people. So, the idea that China acted rapidly and
decisively, and hence prevented the worst repercussions of the disease is a
myth.
According
to the figures China reports to the WHO, the spread of nCOV started to slow
down from the middle of February onward, after an anomalous (change in
recording) spike of 20,000 cases over two days (12/2 and 13/2) had been
reported. To-date (11/4) the total number of reported cases, deaths and active
cases stands at c 85,000, c 3,300 and c 1,000 respectively, and the new cases
run rate is about 50 per day on a total population count of c 1.5 billion. In the meantime, the various movement and
congregating restrictions (incl. on wet markets) have been relaxed. Things are almost
back to normal.
Now,
this makes no sense from a number of perspectives. First, let's take a look at
how the epidemic panned out (pandemic, black pun) in Italy.
The
first recorded case (cases, two) in Italy is that of two Chinese
tourists in Rome on January 31. Flights to and from China are suspended
immediately. A week later, a Milanese is also diagnosed to have contracted the
disease; from where remains uncertain. Two weeks later, a cluster of 16 cases
and another of 60 cases are reported in Lombardy (the province of Milan) and
contiguous Veneto. The Italian authorities are again quick to take action. On
February 22 eleven municipalities in Lombardy and Veneto are closed down – the
'red' zone. The cancellation of all sporting fixtures and public events quickly
follows, but the disease equally quickly spreads across the whole peninsula and
to the islands.
By
March 11, the whole country is 'locked down'. A final measure on March 21 is
the closing of all non-essential business and industry; everybody else staying
idly at home. All to little avail, as the disease continues to rage, only
starting to plateau at a rough rate of 5,000 new cases and 750 fatalities a day
towards the end of that month. And to-date (Easter Sunday, April 12) there is
only a faint glimmer of regression, with 4694 new cases and 616 deaths being
recorded yesterday (admittedly a small bit of a spike above the rough rolling
average of the last week of 5,000 cases and 600 deaths). The total toll so far:
152,000 cases and 19,500 deaths in a population of 60 million.
Put
the two case reports side-by-side in a table and you'd wonder is it the same
disease that is at work here at all; not for a minute suggesting it is not.
China
|
Italy
|
|
First Case (A.)
|
17/11/2019
|
31/01/2020
|
First Cluster (C.)
|
03/01/2020 (41 no.)
|
21/02/2020 (76 no.)
|
First Case to Cluster (A. - C.)
|
48 days
|
21 days
|
First 'Local' Shutdown
|
23/01/2020 (Huwan)
|
22/02/2020 (Lombardy)
|
Full Shutdown (D.)
|
14/02/2020 (Hubei mainly)
|
21/03/2020 (all Italy)
|
Time to Full Shutdown (B. - D.)
|
42 days
|
28 days
|
Reported Cases to-date
|
85,000
|
152,000
|
Reported Deaths to-date
|
3,300
|
19,500 (13%!)
|
Daily New Cases now
|
50
|
600
|
Active Cases today
|
100
|
100,000
|
Relevant Population
|
230 million (Hubei only, say)
|
60 million (whole country)
|
Deaths per million
|
15
|
325
|
The
simplest and least controversial explanation for this enormous difference
between the statistics is that for internal propaganda reasons, China is being
economical with the truth. There would appear to be plenty of observed evidence
for this.
In
China the dead are cremated. Burials are banned. In Wuhan City there are seven
crematoria with 84 ovens in total and according to LifeSiteNews, these
mortuaries were advertising for additional staff to man night shifts and swing
and weekend work from mid January onward, and lorry loads of urns (2,500 per
lorry) were being delivered every couple of days. LifeSiteNews cites other
'very busy' indicators – no charge for cremations, no funeral services, no
collecting of urns – from late January on till the end of March, but these
could also all just be explained as fair and sensible in the circumstances of a
deadly epidemic.
Tellingly,
when the collection of the urns of deceased relatives was again permitted, over
a window commencing March 23 and ending appropriately enough on Tomb Sweeping
Day, April 4, 500 urns were released each day from the seven mortuaries
(source: Radio Free Asia), so
that is 42,000 urns. Subtracting the normal Chinese mortality rate of 0.7% per
annum over say a two month period applied to the population of Hubei (60
million, same as Italy), the number of non-normal deaths comes to 35,000, a
completely different figure to the 3,300 reported deaths for China as a whole
to-date. Let's just sense-check: 84 ovens, 2 hour turnaround, 24 hours gives a
theoretical daily capacity of 1,000 cremations a day; so 42,000 urns is six
weeks output, working 24/7.
But
we don't have to rely on just the speculations of a Canadian reactionary
conservative, opinion-forming and therefore unlikely to be unbiased website
like LifeSiteNews to make us wonder; Bloomberg and The Guardian too
are happy to cast doubt on the Chinese numbers, citing leaked US Intelligence. Amazingly,
The Donald doesn't put the boot in simply shouting fake news, but much more
coyly simply suggests the numbers seem a little light. No need to shout? Must
be true then.
And
then there's common sense. The place is a dictatorship and the democratic rule-of-thumb
familiar to us in the West of "do what you must to assure re-election"
does not apply to its leadership. So, why would you take such completely
economically devastating measures to save a few thousand or ten thousand lives,
given you control the lives of 1.5 billion inhabitants and the long-term goal
is world domination?
Let's
say with inadequate/overrun healthcare the death rate of those who contract nCOV
is as much as 5% (the WHO says it's no more than 2%). Dictatorially rationally,
you'd have to be convinced that unchecked and before a vaccine can be developed
(say 12 mo, I'm assuming the Chinese are ahead, see later) nearly everybody
will catch it, before you'd decide to take measures that will reverse your
annual economic growth from 6% or 7% to zero.
You
can see a very simplified model of the two options below. Chinese population,
GDP and growth numbers in 2019 are rounded to big figures and approximate for
illustration purposes, and my 2020 base forecast before nCOV is also in rounded
numbers. Population growth in China is actually 0.5%,and forecast GDP growth…
well my estimate is as good as the next.
Population (m)
|
Population growth
|
GDP/cap. ($)
|
Prod'ivity growth
|
GDP
($ m)
|
GDP growth
|
|
2019 (approx.)
|
1,500
|
10,000
|
15,000,000
|
|||
2020 (a forecast)
|
1,515
|
1%
|
10,500
|
5%
|
15,907,500
|
6%
|
2020 (1/ shutdown)
|
1,515
|
1%
|
10,000
|
0%
|
15,150,000
|
1%
|
2020 (2/ do nothing)
|
1,470
|
-2%
|
10,500
|
5%
|
15,435,000
|
3%
|
Underneath
the 2020 base forecast then, you have the two nCOV response strategies:
1/ shutdown,
which will leave population growth largely unaffected, but eliminates
productivity growth for the year (if you don't work, there is no productivity),
resulting in 1% GDP growth;
2/ do
nothing, resulting in 2% population decline (1% growth less say 3% 'disparition'
as the French call it – i.e. only 60% catch it before the vaccine is
available), but no decline in productivity (everybody who stays alive and does
work, keeps working) and thus GDP growth falls back from the base forecast, but
is only halved to 3%, rather than decimated to 1%.
Yes,
there are a ton of challenges you could make to this awful, simple model, not
least of which is that productivity growth will return and in fact be stronger
after the year of 'shutdown'. It probably will return, but will it be stronger?
The disruption of complex supply chains and global business relations will be
badly damaged. Things won't just start-up again as if nothing has happened.
On
the other hand most of the people who will die will be pensioners (anecdotally:
90% of the deaths in Ireland to-date are over-65s; the median age of the
deceased in Switzerland to-date is 83), so equating a 'do nothing' cull (which
is what it would be) to a same fall in productive capacity is very pessimistic.
I am 66, so I am not making these points lightly, and I am of course writing
about the choices facing an autocratic regime.
I
think then you have to conclude the Chinese leaders had reason to expect the
very worst if they had taken the 'do nothing' option. Why would that be?
Let's
go back to why they might have gone light on reporting the numbers, again. A
more conspiratorial reason, than the great Chinese cause of internal propaganda,
could be an international economic political one. "We caught a bad cold,
and it is truly terrible; let's make sure our rivals catch pneumonia, by
pretending our cold wasn't much." Especially since we know what really
caused it, and we should have a vaccine to combat it soon. A global mass market
opens up.
Scurrilous
speculation of course, but there is reason to think they know more about wat is
going on than they are telling. I'll refer to two separate publications:
1/ a paper
by Pradhan,
Pandet et al of the Biological Sciences school at the New Delhi Institute
of Technology, with no particular axe to grind, about the microbiology of the
virus, now retracted but still out there.
2/ a
report by an unidentified Professor of Neurobiology at Pittsburgh State in collaboration
with Dr. Karl Sirotkin, a retired scientist with 30 years of experience in
genomic sequencing at the Theoretical Biology Division of the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and a former NSA counterterrorism analyst, i.e. by a less neutral
team. The report has been widely published i.a. on Harvard
to the Big House, on Simple
Life, and on Your
News. All of these on-line websites have an agenda, but not a particularly
anti-Chinese one.
Pradan
and Pandet's stuff is very bio-technical, but the essence is that nCOV is quite
different from its sister corona viruses and from those hosted by the horeshoe
bat. The jump from its known possible ancestors to the nCOV that is infecting
humans is too big to have simply happened in the time available. I guess there
should have been intermediate steps. Moreover, they suggest that nCOV has four
'inserts' similar to those in HIV-1. These 'inserts' improve the performance of
the 'spikes' (the pointy bits sticking out from the spheroid shape in the pictures
that then burrow into your cells). They insinuate no more than this, but it has
to be said, many of their peers are quite scathing.
Karl
Sirotkin is more of a secret agent than a biologist. Wuhan, of course, is home
to the only BSL-4 virology laboratory in China. BSL-4 stands for Biosafety
Level 4, the highest. Sirotkin reports that the lab's staff members Zhengli Shi
and Xing-Yi previously worked at an American lab which had already
bio-engineered an incredibly virulent strain of bat coronavirus. Zhengli Shi
has a history of interest in corona viruses. A project of particular interest
is the use of coronaviruses as a vector for an HIV vaccine. Sirotkin speculates
that Zhengli Si may have been working on such a project in Wuhan and if not,
more generally on what are called dual-use gain-of-function research. Dual-use
means for good or evil.
Zhengli
Si's track record in the US, according to Sirotkin, was less than meticulous when
it came to hygiene and safety. Additionally, the Wuhan lab is known for "sloppy
field research methods" and, as late as mid February 2020, the Chinese
Ministry of Science "sent out a directive to all its labs emphasizing the
importance of carefully handling bio-infectious agents, alluding to slack
oversight and past lapses, mentioning coronaviruses specifically." There
is loads more in Sirotkin's report, but you get the picture.
So,
there you have it:
· The horseshoe bat hibernates.
· The Chinese authorities have left the Wuhan wet
markets re-open.
· People haven't stopped eating pangolin.
·
Wuhan's BSL-4 viral laboratory works on corona
virus research (it's the main game in town).
·
The lab and two named employees have an imperfect record
on hygiene and safety.
·
The new nCOV virus is an unusual/unlikely natural
mutation.
·
The reported Chinese numbers on the nCOV outbreak seem
light.
·
The autocratically rational response if the likely
death toll is light (2%) is not to shut down.
It
started in China.
